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Abstract
An innovative ﬁrm chooses strategically whether to patent its process
innovation or rely on secrecy. By doing so, the ﬁrm manages its
rival’s beliefs about the size of the innovation, and aﬀects the in-
centives in the product market. Diﬀerent measures of competitive
p r e s s u r ei nt h ep r o d u c tm a r k e th a v ed i ﬀerent eﬀects on the equi-
librium patenting choices of an innovative ﬁrm with unknown costs
and probabilistic patent validity. Increasing the number of ﬁrms (de-
gree of product substitutability) gives a smaller (greater) patenting
incentive. Switching from Bertrand to Cournot competition gives
a smaller (greater) patenting incentive if patent protection is weak
(strong).
Keywords: Bertrand and Cournot competition, oligopoly, product diﬀerentiation,
entry, asymmetric information, strategic disclosure, stochastic patent, trade secret,
process innovation, imitation
JEL Codes: D82, L13, O31, O32
∗I thank Vincenzo Denicolò, Christoph Engel, Chiara Fumagalli, Georg von Graevenitz, Diet-
mar Harhoﬀ, Massimo Motta, Andreas Nicklisch, Jo Seldeslachts, Nicolas Serrano-Velarde, Ste-
fano Trento, Achim Wambach, Philipp Weinschenk, Elmar Wolfstetter, and seminar participants
at the Catholic University in Milan, the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (Florence),
University of Bologna, HCER (Helsinki), University of Cologne, the EARIE conference (Valencia),
SFB/TR15 conference (Gummersbach), and Zvi Griliches Summer School in the Economics of Inno-
vation (Barcelona) for their comments. I am grateful for the support of the Social Science Research
Center Berlin (WZB) and the European University Institute (Florence), where part of the research
for this paper was done. All errors are mine.
†Address: Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, D-53113 Bonn, Germany; E-mail <jansen@coll.mpg.de>1 Introduction
This paper studies the incentives of an innovative ﬁrm to patent its process innovation
in an oligopoly. A patent discloses the technology to the ﬁrm’s competitors, but also
gives some protection against expropriation of the disclosed technology. However,
patents are imperfect, and only give protection with a certain probability (Lemley
and Shapiro, 2005). For example, surveys in the 1980s and 1990s of Levin et al.
(1987) and Cohen et al. (2000) ﬁnd that high-level R&D executives in the US do not
consider patent the most eﬀective appropriability mechanism of process innovations.
Instead secrecy was often considered as one of the most eﬀective ways to protect
process innovations.
I analyze the patenting incentives in a model of asymmetric information about
the size of the innovation. In such a setting an innovative ﬁrm faces the following
trade-oﬀ. On the one hand, the potential expropriation of a patented technology
yields a more eﬃcient, and more “aggressive” competitor in the product market. This
expropriation eﬀect gives the innovative ﬁrm a disincentive to apply for a patent. On
the other hand, patenting a technology is a way to persuade the competitor of the
technology’s eﬃciency. This creates a signaling eﬀect. The innovative ﬁrm manages
the expectations of its competitor in the product market, and thereby aﬀects his
conduct, by patenting certain technologies while keeping other technologies secret. If
ﬁrms compete in prices, they have an incentive to patent ineﬃcient technologies and
keep eﬃcient technologies secret, since this relaxes price competition, and it keeps the
cost of expropriation low.
The way in which the market conduct is aﬀected by technology disclosure, depends
on the competitive pressure in the industry. I study how the strength of competitive
pressure aﬀects the incentive to patent a new production technology. In particular, the
competitive pressure is changed in three ways. First, increasing the number of non-
innovative ﬁrms in the industry increases the intensity of price competition. Second,
increasing the degree of product substitutability is an alternative way of increasing
the competitive pressure. Firms that produce close substitutes compete more ﬁercely
than ﬁrms that produce more diﬀerentiated goods. Third, switching from a market
where ﬁrms strategically set prices (Bertrand competition), to a market where they
set output levels (Cournot competition) lowers the competitive pressure for the ﬁrms
(e.g. see Singh and Vives, 1984).
Diﬀerent measures of competitive pressure aﬀect the patenting incentives in dif-
ferent ways. Changes of the number of rivals and the product substitutability change
1the relative strength of the signaling eﬀect of disclosure. An increase of the number of
non-innovative competitors makes the signalling relatively weaker, and gives a smaller
incentive to patent. An increase of the product substitutability has the opposite eﬀect,
i.e., it gives a greater incentive to patent.
A change of the mode of competition changes the direction of the signaling eﬀect.
A Bertrand oligopolist has an incentive to appear as an ineﬃcient, “soft” competitor
in the product market to encourage its competitor (strategic complements). Conse-
quently, in the absence of expropriation the ﬁrm has an incentive to disclose ineﬃcient
technologies, and keep eﬃcient technologies secret. By contrast, a Cournot oligopolist
has an incentive to do the opposite, i.e., only disclose eﬃcient technologies to persuade
the competitor that he will face ﬁerce competition in the product market (strategic
substitutes). The eﬀect of expropriation is similar under both modes of competition.
Clearly, the change of the incentives changes the equilibrium strategies. The aim of
the paper is to characterize these changes, and explore their economic consequences.
The analysis may give an explanation for the phenomenon of collective invention
(Allen, 1983, and Nuvolari, 2004). For example, proﬁt-maximizing iron producers in
19th century England shared small technology improvements freely with their com-
petitors in the absence of intellectual property right protection. This observation is
consistent with the technology sharing equilibrium in my model of Bertrand compe-
tition.
The literature on information sharing in oligopoly (e.g. Gal-Or, 1986, and Shapiro,
1986), and particularly recent work on strategic information sharing (Okuno-Fujiwara
et al., 1990) has focused on the implications of the signaling eﬀect of information dis-
closure for product market conduct. Recently, Anton and Yao (2003, 2004), Gill
(2008), and Jansen (2006, 2009) analyze the trade-oﬀ between the expropriation ef-
fect and signaling eﬀects in models with strategic substitutability in the production
stage. However, as far as I know, this is the ﬁr s tp a p e rt oa n a l y z ei ti nam o d e lo f
Bertrand competition, and to compare the two modes of competition. Changing the
mode of competition changes the patenting incentives in an interesting way. More-
over, Anton and Yao (2003, 2004), and Jansen (2006) focus on duopolistic markets
with homogeneous goods, while I also consider oligopolistic markets with horizontally
diﬀerentiated goods here. Finally, whereas Anton and Yao (2003-4) consider divisible
innovations, where a ﬁrm can choose to patent only an arbitrarily small part of the
new technology, I consider indivisible technologies, as in Gill (2008).1
1Whether innovations can be subdivided in small parts depends on the technology. If a process
2A second stream of literature, related to this paper, is the recent literature on
endogenous knowledge spillovers. For example, De Fraja (1993), Katsoulacos and
Ulph (1998), Kamien and Zang (2000), Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003), Fosfuri
and Rønde (2004), and Milliou (2009) analyze the choice of technology diﬀusion in
oligopoly models of complete information. Whereas expropriation of technological
knowledge aﬀects the spillover choice in these papers, there is no role for signaling.
By contrast, signaling plays a central role in my model.
The paper is also related to the extensive literature on the relationship between
innovation incentives and competitive pressure (see e.g. Belleﬂamme and Vergari,
2006, Gilbert, 2006, and Vives, 2008, for overviews). Whereas this literature typically
analyzes how competitive pressure aﬀects the incentives to create new knowledge, I
study the eﬀects on the incentives to diﬀuse new knowledge. In other words, my
analysis is complementary to this literature.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model. Section
3 characterizes the equilibrium pricing strategies under patenting and trade secrecy,
and the equilibrium patenting strategies. Section 4 discusses the eﬀects of competitive
pressure on the incentive to patent an innovation. Section 5 analyzes the robustness
of the main results. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper. Appendix A contains
the proofs of the paper’s main propositions. Appendix B gives more details on the
extensions, and makes some observations on the implications for the consumer surplus.
2T h e M o d e l
Consider N +1risk-neutral ﬁrms, ﬁrm I and ﬁrms 1,..,N, producing diﬀerentiated
goods, with N ≥ 1.F i r m I, the innovative ﬁrm, obtains a patentable non-drastic
process innovation, which yields a production cost θI ∈ [θ,θ],d r a w nf r o mp . d . f .f :
[θ,θ] → R+ (and corresponding c.d.f. F :[ θ,θ] → [0,1]), with 0 ≤ θ < θ.T h e
production cost θI is private information to ﬁrm I.2 Firms 1,..,N, the non-innovative
ﬁrms, have an ineﬃcient, non-patentable technology, with the production cost θ,i . e . ,
θ1 = ... = θN = θ.3
After ﬁrm I learns its cost, it makes its patent choices. Firm I chooses whether
innovation cannot be broken in small parts, then the full disclosure requirement of a patent only
leaves the choice between truthful disclosure or complete concealment of the technology.
2This speciﬁcation allows for uncertainty about the existence of an innovation by assigning a
positive probability mass to the atom θI = θ.
3The assumption that there is only one innovative ﬁrm is made for simplicity. In section 5 I show
that the patenting incentives are similar when there are more innovative ﬁrms in the industry.
3to ﬁle for a patent and consequently reveal its cost truthfully, s(θI)=θI,o rt ok e e p
its cost secret and send the uninformative message s(θI)=∅.
Patents are always granted, but their validity is challenged in court. The ﬁrm’s
patent for the new technology is successfully defended in court with probability γP,
where 0 ≤ γP ≤ 1. However, with probability 1 − γP t h ep a t e n ti si n v a l i d ,a n dt h e
ﬁrms 1,..,N can imitate the patent holder’s technology without incurring any cost.4
A trade secret remains secret with probability γS, but with probability 1 − γS the
secret leaks out to the competitors, enabling them to imitate the leaked technology at
no additional cost. To make the problem interesting, I assume that imitation is more
likely under patenting than under secrecy γP ≤ γS ≤ 1.5 For the analysis of patent
incentives there is no loss of generality to set γS =1and γP = γ with γ ≤ 1.6 The
parameter γ measures the relative protection of patents vis-a-vis secrets.
Finally, after messages are received and the validity of the patent is determined,
ﬁr m sc h o o s et h ep r i c e so ft h e i rd i ﬀerentiated goods simultaneously (Bertrand compe-
tition). Firm   with cost θ  chooses its price, p  ≥ 0, and earns the proﬁt:
π (p;θ )=D (p)(p  − θ ) (2.1)
for   ∈ {I,1,..,N}.H e r e D (p) is the demand at prices p ≡ (pI,p 1,..,p N) of the
representative consumer who enjoys the following utility (e.g. see Dixit, 1979) from
consuming the bundle q ≡ (qI,q 1,..,q N) for  ,k ∈ {I,1,..,N}:

















Consequently, the inverse demand for the good of ﬁrm   is linear in quantities, i.e.,




4Clearly, the probability of holding an invalid patent can also be interpreted as the probability
with which the patent validity is challenged in court, and the defense of the patent fails.
5The model with stronger protection of patents than secrets (γP >γ S) would yield the patenting
of all technologies in equilibrium, since the signalling beneﬁts of patenting (e.g. Gal-Or, 1986, and
Okuno-Fujiwara et al., 1990) would be reinforced by the beneﬁt of less frequent expropriation. The
assumption γP ≤ γS is consistent with earlier theoretical work (e.g. Anton and Yao, 2003, 2004),
and empirical results (e.g. Cohen et al., 2000).
6If ΠP is the proﬁt from a valid patent, ΠS is the proﬁt from a secret, and ΠI is the proﬁta f t e r
imitation, then the expected proﬁt gain from patenting instead of secrecy is: [γPΠP +(1−γP)ΠI]−
[γSΠS +(1−γS)ΠI].T h i sp r o ﬁtd i ﬀerence equals: [γPΠP +(γS −γP)ΠI]−γSΠS. Clearly, the sign
of this net proﬁti st h es a m ea st h es i g no f :[γΠP +( 1− γ)ΠI] − ΠS,w i t hγ ≡ γP/γS.
4with  ,k ∈ {I,1,..,N}. The direct demand equals:
D (p)=
1
(1 − β)(1 + Nβ)
µ






where  ,k ∈ {I,1,..,N}.F i r mI’s innovation is non-drastic, i.e., I assume that
α ≥ 2θ − θ. (2.5)
Parameter β represents the degree of product diﬀerentiation, with 0 <β<1.F o r
example, if β → 0, the markets for the goods are independent. The greater β,t h em o r e
substitutable the ﬁrms’ goods. I assume that the goods are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated
(i.e., β is suﬃciently low), such that both ﬁrms produce in equilibrium, i.e., β ≤ β or:
[2 + (2N − 1)β](1 − β)(α − θ) ≥ [1 + (N − 1)β]β(θ − θ) (2.6)
I solve the game backwards, and restrict the analysis to pure-strategy equilibria.
3 Equilibrium Strategies
First, I characterize the equilibrium prices for any given patent choice and belief.
Second, I derive the equilibrium patenting strategy.
3.1 Pricing Strategies
For any given competitors’ prices, p− ,p r o ﬁt-maximization by ﬁrm   with marginal
cost θ  yields the following best response function (for  ,k ∈ {I,1,..,N}):




(1 − β)α + β
P
k6=  pk
2[1 + (N − 1)β]
. (3.1)
First, I solve the product market stage under complete information. This situation
emerges after ﬁrm I patents its technology θI. The cost of non-innovative ﬁrms
1,..,N depends on the validity of ﬁrm I’s patent. If the patent is valid, then the non-
innovative ﬁrms cannot adopt the new technology, and θ1 = ... = θN = θ. The best





















2+( N − 2)β
Ã
(1 − β)(α − θ )+
1+( N − 1)β




(θk − θ )
!
(3.3)
If, on the other hand, the patent is invalid, then imitation gives all ﬁrms the marginal
cost θI. In this case, each ﬁrm sets the symmetric equilibrium price-cost margin
mb
 (θI,Nθ I) as in (3.3) for   ∈ {I,1,..,N}.
Second, I derive the Bayesian Nash equilibria of the product market stage for any
posterior beliefs under incomplete information. After ﬁrm I adopts secrecy there is
asymmetric information about ﬁrm I’s marginal cost θI, and no imitation is possible.
Firm I’s best response function remains rI(p−I;θI).F i r m s1,..,Nupdate their beliefs
about ﬁrm I’s marginal cost, yielding posterior expected cost E{θI|∅},a n dt h e y
adopt the best response functions (3.1) for   =1 ,..,N where pI is replaced by the
expected price E{pI(θI)|∅}. Consequently, the equilibrium price-cost margins are
mb
n(θ,E{θI|∅} +( N − 1)θ) for n =1 ,..,N, and the margin for ﬁrm I is:
m
B







[2 + (N − 2)β][2 + (2N − 1)β]
. (3.4)
In any case, in equilibrium ﬁrm   supplies the following output level and earns the
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The innovative ﬁrm bases its patenting decision on the comparison of the expected
proﬁts from secrecy, and from patenting. The diﬀerence between the expected proﬁt
from secrecy and patenting is πB
I (θI;E{θI|∅}) − γπb
I(θI,Nθ) − (1 − γ)πb
I(θI,Nθ I),



























7As usual, the equilibrium price is increasing in the costs. The equilibrium price-cost margin is
decreasing the own cost, since only part of a ﬁrm’s cost increase is passed through to consumers.
6for x,y ∈ [θ,θ].T h eﬁrst term of expression (3.7) embodies the expropriation eﬀect.
In the event of patent invalidity, which happens with probability 1 − γ,t h et e r m
compares ﬁrm I’s proﬁts from a valid patent with the proﬁt from an invalid patent.
The second term captures the signaling eﬀect. It compares the ﬁrm’s proﬁtf r o m
secrecy, where ﬁrm n expects the cost y,w i t ht h ep r o ﬁt from a valid patent. In other
words, while keeping the technology of ﬁrm n ﬁxed at the level θn = θ, the second
term measures the proﬁte ﬀect of moving from asymmetric information to complete
information.
A technology disclosure by ﬁrm I has two eﬀects on competition in the product
market. On the one hand, imitation makes ﬁrms 1,..,N more “aggressive” competi-
tors, i.e., the ﬁrms’ best response functions shift inwards (to the left). I call this
the expropriation eﬀect. On the other hand, disclosure enables ﬁrms 1,..,N to up-
date their beliefs about ﬁrm I’s product market conduct. This, in turn, may change
the non-innovative ﬁrms’ conduct in the product market, i.e., a non-innovative ﬁrm
“moves along” its best response curve. This is a signaling eﬀect. The proposition
below characterizes the equilibrium patenting rule which results from this trade-oﬀ.
Proposition 1 For any 0 ≤ γ<1, a critical value θ
b exists, with θ <θ
b < θ,s u c h




∅,i fθ ≤ θI ≤ θ
b,
θI,o t h e r w i s e .
(3.8)
In any equilibrium the patenting strategy is as in (3.8) for some θ <θ
b < θ.F o rγ =1
ﬁrm I chooses the patenting strategy sb(θI)=θI for any θI ∈ [θ,θ] in equilibrium.
The intuition for this result lies in the analysis of the signaling eﬀect. Since ﬁrms
compete in prices in the product market, their product market strategies are strategic
complements. Consequently, if ﬁrm I discloses a technology which is more eﬃcient
than expected, then the non-innovative ﬁrms adjust their prices downwards (i.e., they
“move down” along their best response curves), and become more aggressive competi-
tors. That is, in this case the expropriation eﬀect and the signaling eﬀect reinforce
each other, and give a disincentive to apply for a patent. Conversely, disclosure of a
technology which is less eﬃcient than expected makes the non-innovative ﬁrms less
aggressive competitors in the product market (strategic complements). That is, in
this case the expropriation and signaling eﬀect conﬂict, and the patenting incentives
are determined by their trade-oﬀ.F o rs u ﬃciently high cost parameters the signaling
eﬀe c to u t w e i g h st h ee x p r o p r i a t i o ne ﬀect, and disclosure softens the conduct of the
7non-innovative ﬁrms in the product market. That is, although imitation of a minor
innovation makes the ﬁrms 1,..,N slightly more productive competitors, the ﬁrms
charge a higher price, since they drastically downgrade their beliefs about the aggres-
siveness of ﬁrm I’s pricing strategy.8 As a result, ﬁrm I has an incentive to patent
such a technology. In short, ﬁrm I has an incentive to patent ineﬃcient technologies,
and keep eﬃcient technologies secret.
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium patenting incentives for a duopolist (N =1 )i n
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Figure 1: Equilibrium patenting (no protection)
functions of the ﬁrms for extreme technologies, i.e., rI(pn;θ) and rI(pn;θ) for ﬁrm I,
and rn(pI;θ) and rn(pI;θ) for ﬁrm n.I fﬁrm I shares its technology, the equilibrium
prices correspond to a point on the line T-T0. For example, if the ﬁrm has technology
θ and shares it, the equilibrium prices correspond to point T0;i fi ts h a r e sθ
b, then the
ﬁrms reach equilibrium point E; sharing technology θ yields point T. The adoption of
secrecy gives the following. Firm n has technology θ and it believes that ﬁrm I has
a pricing strategy that corresponds to the expected best response E{rI(pn;θI)|θI ≤
θ
b}, which lies between the curves rI(pn;θ
b) and rI(pn;θ). The point where ﬁrm I’s
expected best response crosses ﬁrm n’s best response rn(pI;θ) determines ﬁrm n’s
equilibrium price level, pb
n(θ,E{θI|θI ≤ θ
b}).F i r mI plays a best response against the
price pb
n(θ,E{θI|θI ≤ θ
b}), which yields a point along the line S-S0. For example, if
the ﬁrm keeps technology θ secret, the equilibrium prices correspond to point S0;i fi t
8For example, for a ﬁrm with the least eﬃcient technology (θI = θ) the expropriation eﬀect is
absent, while the signalling eﬀect remains, if ﬁrms 1,..,N do not hold degenerate beliefs about ﬁrm
i’s cost (i.e. E{θI|∅} 6= θ), and is at its strongest.
8hides θ
b, then the ﬁrms reach equilibrium point E; hiding technology θ yields point S.
Comparing the equilibrium prices that ﬁrm I sets after technology sharing with the
ﬁrm’s prices under secrecy gives the following. If ﬁrm I has a lower cost than θ
b,t h e n
it can reach a higher equilibrium price by adopting secrecy. For example, the ﬁrm that
hides technology θ sets price pB
I (θ;E{θI|θI ≤ θ
b}) which is greater than the price it
would set if it were to share the technology, pb
I(θ,θ), since point S0 lies above point T0.
By contrast, if ﬁrm I’s technology is less productive than θ
b, then technology sharing
gives higher equilibrium prices. For example, the least eﬃcient type sets pb
I(θ,θ) after
it discloses, which is greater than its price under secrecy, pB
I (θ;E{θI|θI ≤ θ
b}),s i n c e
point T lies above point S. The threshold value for patenting, θ
b, is exactly the cost at
which ﬁrm I is indiﬀerent between patenting and trade secrecy (point E), given beliefs
of ﬁrm n consistent with patenting strategy sb in (3.8), i.e., E{θI|∅} = E{θI|θ ≤ θ
b}.
3.3 Comparative Statics
For the comparative statics analyses in the next sections I adopt the following deﬁni-
tion, since the equilibrium need not be unique.9
Deﬁnition 1 Deﬁne for some parameter z the set of equilibrium thresholds for the
patenting strategy (3.8) as Θb(z). Then the equilibrium threshold θ
b in (3.8) is increas-
ing (decreasing) in z if for any feasible pair z0 and z00with z0 <z 00, and any equilibrium
threshold θ
b(z0) ∈ Θb(z0), there exists an equilibrium threshold θ
b(z00) ∈ Θb(z00) such
that θ
b(z0) <θ
b(z00) < θ (respectively, θ <θ
b(z00) <θ
b(z0)).
Using this deﬁnition, a change of the patent validity parameter γ gives the following
comparative statics result.
Proposition 2 For γ<1, the equilibrium threshold θ
b in (3.8) is decreasing in γ.
In other words, the stronger the patent protection, the weaker the expropriation
eﬀect, and the stronger ﬁrm I’s incentive to patent the technology. This is intuitive.
The uniform technology distribution (i.e., F(θI)=( θI −θ)/(θ −θ) for θI ∈ [θ,θ])
yields a unique equilibrium. Figure 2 illustrates the proposition for a uniformly distrib-
uted technology θI. The bold, downward-sloping curve sketches the threshold level θ
b
in Proposition 1 as a function of the patent validity parameter γ.T e c h n o l o g i e sa b o v e
t h ec u r v ea r ep a t e n t e d ,w h i l et e c h n o l o g i e sb e l o wt h ec u r v ea r ek e p ts e c r e t .















Figure 2: Eﬀect of protection (uniform distribution)
Extreme strengths of intellectual property right give the following incentives. On
the one hand, perfect protection (i.e., γ =1 ) eliminates the expropriation eﬀect
of patenting a technology. The remaining signaling eﬀect makes ﬁrm I disclose all
information in equilibrium, i.e., θ
b = θ.F i r mI’s incentive to patent any technologies
with below-average eﬃciency levels drives the expected cost level of secret technologies
down to the lowest cost level, θ.I no t h e rw o r d s ,f o rγ =1the unraveling result applies
(Okuno-Fujiwara et al., 1990).
On the other hand, in the absence of intellectual property rights (i.e., γ =0 ), the
innovative ﬁrm trades oﬀ the expropriation eﬀect against the signaling eﬀect. Inter-
estingly, in spite of the full expropriation of any disclosed technology, the innovative
ﬁrm still has an incentive to share some technologies with its competitors (i.e., any
θI >θ
b), as is shown in Proposition 1. This results from the ﬁrm’s incentive to
strategically manage its competitors’ expectations in the product market. It may ex-
plain the phenomenon of collective invention (Allen, 1983), where ﬁrms freely share
incremental process innovations with their competitors.
A change of the technology distribution function has the following eﬀect:
Proposition 3 Take any two distributions F and G with EF{θI|θI ≤ x} ≥ EG{θI|θI ≤
x} for all x ∈ [θ,θ]. For any equilibrium threshold θ
b
F in (3.8) for distribution F,t h e r e
exists an equilibrium threshold θ
b





Skewing the distribution towards eﬃcient technologies (by moving from F to G)
gives a stronger signaling eﬀect. The disclosure of an ineﬃcient technology by a
10patent creates a more drastic update of the non-innovative ﬁrms’ beliefs, and thereby
ag r e a t e rp r i c ee ﬀect. The stronger signaling eﬀect gives a greater incentive to patent
technologies.
The condition in Proposition 3 is satisﬁed if F dominates G in terms of the re-
verse hazard rate (i.e., f(θ)/F(θ) ≥ g(θ)/G(θ) for all θ). For example, the trun-













An increase of the hazard rate parameter λ increases the conditional expected cost
E{θI|θI ≤ x} for all x ∈ [0,θ].10 Then Proposition 3 implies that the equilibrium
patenting threshold θ
b is increasing in λ.11
4 Competitive Pressure
In this section I analyze the eﬀects of competitive pressure on the incentives to patent
the technology θI. First, I increase the competitive pressure by increasing the number
of non-innovative ﬁrms in the industry. Second, I increase the degree of substitutabil-
ity between products, β. Finally, I change the mode of competition by switching from
competition in prices (Bertrand) to competition in output levels (Cournot).
4.1 Number of Competitors
One way of increasing the competitive pressure on the innovative ﬁrm is to increase
the number of non-innovative ﬁrms in the industry, N (Boone, 2000). Increasing N
gives the following (using Deﬁnition 1).
Proposition 4 If γ =0(no protection), then the equilibrium threshold θ
b in (3.8) is
increasing in N for any N ≥ 1.
In other words, in equilibrium the entry of non-innovative ﬁrms gives a lower
incentive to apply for a patent. For example, the uniform technology distribution
gives a unique patenting equilibrium. In the absence of protection the threshold value
θ
b for the uniform distribution equals:
θ
b
U = θ −
β(θ − θ)
4+( 4 N − 3)β
(4.1)






, and it is straight-
forward to show that ∂E{θI|θI ≤ x}/∂λ > 0 for all 0 <x≤ θ.
11Another non-parametric example that satisﬁes the proposition’s suﬃcient condition is a setting
in which F is convex and G is concave. In that case EG{θI|θI ≤ x} ≤ 1
2x ≤ EF{θI|θI ≤ x} for all x.
11Clearly, this value increases in the number of non-innovative ﬁrms (i.e., ∂θ
b
U/∂N > 0).
An illustration of this result goes as follows. The best response function rI(p−I;θI)
in (3.1) captures the pricing strategy of ﬁrm I. Since the best response is only a
function of the cumulative price of the non-innovative ﬁrms, the best response can be
redeﬁned as rI(PN;θI) where PN ≡
PN
k=1 pk. The system of best response functions
rn(p−n;θn) in (3.1) for n =1 ,...,N,w i t hθ1 = ... = θN, can be reduced to a single
cumulative best response function NRN(pI;θn). Adding the best response functions
of non-innovative ﬁrms, and solving for the sum of their prices, PN,a ta n yp r i c eo f
ﬁrm I, and dividing by N, gives the cumulative best response per non-innovative ﬁrm:
RN(pI;θn)=
1+( N − 1)β
2+( N − 1)β
θn +
(1 − β)α + βpI
2+( N − 1)β
(4.2)





(1 − β)α + Nβb pN
2[1 + (N − 1)β]
(4.3)
with b pN ≡ PN/N, and the cumulative best response per non-innovative ﬁrm, RN(pI;θn),
gives the equilibrium prices of the innovative ﬁrm and a non-innovative ﬁrm. Figure
3 illustrates these best responses for a given belief about ﬁrm I’s technology, and two
















































Figure 3: Eﬀects of entry (N00 >N 0)
best response curves when there are N0 (respectively, N00) non-innovative ﬁrms. First,
12consider the case in which ﬁrm I competes with N0 non-innovative ﬁrms. Analogous
to the discussion of Figure 1, if the ﬁrm hides a technology of below-average eﬃciency,
then it can reach some price along the line A0-B0.I fﬁrm I has a technology such that its
best response curve runs through point E0,t h e nt h eﬁrm is indiﬀerent between secrecy
and technology sharing. The ﬁrm prefers to keep more eﬃcient technologies secret,
w h i l ei ts h a r e sl e s se ﬃcient technologies. Second, similar incentives emerge in case
there are N00 non-innovative ﬁrms. An increase in the number of non-innovative ﬁrms
(e.g. from N0 to N00)m a k e st h ei n n o v a t i v eﬁrm’s best response function RI(b pN;θI)
steeper, whereas it makes a non-innovative ﬁrm’s cumulative best response RN(pI;θn)
less steep, as is illustrated in the ﬁgure.12 Both eﬀects give a higher cost θI at which
ﬁrm I is indiﬀerent between secrecy and technology sharing, for a given belief. In
Figure 3 this is captured by the fact that the distance A00-E00 exceeds the distance
A0-E0, whereas the distance A00-B00 equals the distance A0-B0 for a given belief about
ﬁrm I’s technology. Therefore, all else equal, ﬁrm I has an incentive to keep more
technologies secret after the number of non-innovative ﬁrms grows.
4.2 Product Diﬀerentiation
An alternative way of increasing the competitive pressure on the innovative ﬁrm is to
increase the degree of substitutability between products, β (Boone, 2000).
First, assume that the goods are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated, such that ﬁrms choose
accommodating pricing strategies, i.e., condition (2.6) holds. An increase of β makes
the best responses (4.2) and (4.3) steeper in the price. On the one hand, a steeper best
response of ﬁrm I, (4.3), reduces the incentive to share technologies in the absence
of intellectual property protection. The previous subsection illustrates this point. On
the other hand, a steeper cumulative best response per non-innovative ﬁrm, (4.2),
gives a greater incentive to share technologies. The following proposition shows that
the latter eﬀect dominates (using Deﬁnition 1).
Proposition 5 If γ =0(no protection), then the equilibrium threshold θ
b in (3.8) is
decreasing in β for any β>0 which satisfy condition (2.6).
For example, in the absence of protection, the uniform technology distribution
gives the threshold value θ
b




12An increase of N also shifts both best response functions inwards (towards the origin), but this
does not aﬀect ﬁrm I’s incentives to share its technology.
13At the extreme where goods approach independence (i.e., β → 0), the signaling
eﬀect diminishes. The remaining expropriation eﬀect gives ﬁrm I a disincentive to
patent its technology. In the limit ﬁrm I no longer has an incentive to patent any
technology, i.e., limβ→0 θ
b = θ.13 For positive degrees of substitutability the ﬁrm has
an incentive to patent ineﬃcient technologies in equilibrium (Proposition 1). This
suggests that, at least locally (for β close to zero), patenting incentives are increasing
in the degree of substitutability, i.e., limβ→0 ∂θ
b/∂β < 0. The proposition proves that
the threshold θ
b is decreasing in β for all parameter values that yield accommodating
pricing strategies in the absence of patent protection.
Second, suppose that the goods are close substitutes. With close substitutes, and
as u ﬃciently eﬃcient technology, θI, ﬁrm I has an incentive to set a limit price. A
ﬁrm that can set a limit price does not have the incentive to patent its innovation.
Under secrecy it excludes ﬁrm n by setting the limit price. If the ﬁrm would patent,
then it would have to accommodate ﬁrm n with probability 1−γ. An increase of the
degree of substitutability, β, increases the range of technologies for which limit-pricing
is feasible. Eventually (i.e., for β suﬃciently high), the incentive for secrecy grows,
and ∂θ
b/∂β > 0.I n t h e l i m i t f o r β → 1 (i.e., homogeneous goods) an innovative
ﬁrm with any technology θI < θ can exclude the non-innovative ﬁrm by keeping its
technology secret, while it risks sharing the market after patenting.14 Hence, in the
limit ﬁrm I chooses full secrecy in equilibrium (i.e., limβ→1 θ
b = θ)t oa v o i ds h a r i n g
the market with ﬁrm n.
T h ed e s c r i p t i o na b o v es u g g e s t st h a tt h e r ei sa ni n v e r s eU - s h a p e dr e l a t i o nb e t w e e n
the degree of product substitutability, and the incentive to patent in equilibrium. In
the two extremes, for independent markets and perfect substitutes, the innovative
ﬁrm relies on full secrecy. Between the two extremes the ﬁrm patents ineﬃcient
technologies.
13Clearly, if β =0 , the markets are independent, and ﬁrm I is indiﬀerent between patenting and
secrecy. As a consequence, any patenting strategy can be sustained as an equilibrium strategy. If β<
0, then the goods are complements. As before, imitation gives the non-innovative ﬁrms an incentive
to set lower prices. In the case of complementary goods, the competitors’ price reduction increases
the demand and proﬁt of the innovative ﬁrm. In other words, expropriation gives the innovative
ﬁrm an extra incentive to apply for a patent. Hence, the basic trade-oﬀ between expropriation and
signalling disappears, and the standard unraveling result applies (i.e., the innovative ﬁrm patents all
technologies), whenever the goods are complementary.
14Clearly, the ﬁrm with the worst technology (θI = θ)i si n d i ﬀerent between patenting and secrecy.
144.3 Mode of Competition
Finally, the competitive pressure on the innovative ﬁrm reduces when the ﬁrms switch
from competition in prices to competition in quantities (Singh and Vives, 1984).
4.3.1 Output Strategies
In case of competition in quantities (Cournot competition), ﬁrm   with cost θ  chooses
its output level, q  ≥ 0,t om a x i m i z et h ep r o ﬁt:
π (q;θ )=( P (q) − θ )q . (4.4)
with inverse demand P (q) as in (2.3) for   ∈ {I,1,..,N}.
After ﬁrm I patents its technology θI,t h eﬁrms set output levels under complete
information. If the patent is valid, then ﬁrm   sets the following output level in















(θk − θ )
!
. (4.5)
I ft h ep a t e n ti si n v a l i d ,e a c hﬁrm has the marginal cost θI, and chooses qc
 (θI,Nθ I) as
in (4.5) for   ∈ {I,1,..,N}.
By contrast, if ﬁrm I adopts secrecy, the non-innovative ﬁrms have incomplete
information about the technology θI. Given posterior expected cost E{θI|∅},t h e











βN (θI − E{θI|∅})
(2 + Nβ)(2 − β)
. (4.6)
In any case, ﬁrm  ’s proﬁte q u a l s :πr
 (•)=qr
 (•)2,f o r  ∈ {I,1,..,N} and r ∈ {c,C}.
4.3.2 Patenting Strategies
The patenting choice of a ﬁrm that competes in output levels (strategic substitutes)
also trades oﬀ the expropriation eﬀect and a signaling eﬀect. For technologies with
below-average eﬃciency levels both eﬀects of patenting are negative. In particular,
potential expropriation of the technology makes the rival (ﬁrm n) compete more ag-
gressively. Moreover, the rival updates his beliefs in an unfavorable direction, since
he learns that ﬁrm I is less eﬃcient (and aggressive) than expected, which makes the
rival compete even more aggressively, since the actions are strategic substitutes. In
short, the ﬁrm has no incentive to patent any ineﬃcient technologies. For technologies
15with an above-average eﬃciency level the two eﬀects of patenting are in conﬂict. On
the one hand, the expropriation eﬀect still gives ﬁrm I an incentive to keep the tech-
nology secret. However, on the other hand, now the signaling eﬀect gives an incentive
to apply for a patent.
This brief description of the patenting incentives already suggests that the ﬁrm’s
patenting strategies under Cournot competition diﬀer from the patenting strategies
under Bertrand competition. Whereas the ﬁrm patents only ineﬃcient technologies
under Bertrand competition, it has a clear disincentive to do so under Cournot com-
petition. In the remainder of this subsection I give the conditions under which ﬁrm
I patents eﬃcient technologies. Before stating the proposition, I deﬁne the following
critical value:
γ














where 0 <γ o < 1.
Proposition 6 For any 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 a critical value θ
c exists, with θ ≤ θ
c ≤ θ,s u c h




θI,i fθ ≤ θI <θ
c,
∅,o t h e r w i s e . (4.8)
In particular, (a) an equilibrium exists in which ﬁrm I patents all technologies (i.e.,
θ
c = θ)i fa n do n l yi fγ ≥ 1 − 1
2β; (b) an equilibrium exists in which ﬁrm I keeps
any technology secret (i.e., θ
c = θ)i fa n do n l yi fγ ≤ γo, with γo as in (4.7). (c)
if γo < 1 − 1
4β, then for any γo <γ<1 − 1
4β an equilibrium exists in which ﬁrm I
chooses strategy (4.8) for some θ
c with θ <θ
c < θ. Moreover, for any equilibrium the
patenting strategy is as in (4.8) for some θ ≤ θ
c ≤ θ.
These equilibrium strategies diﬀer from the strategies in Anton and Yao (2003,
2004). The innovative ﬁrm in Anton and Yao patents small innovations to a greater
extent than big innovations, whereas here the reverse tends to happen. That is, the
assumption of indivisibility of the innovation has a non-trivial eﬀect on the strategies
that the innovative ﬁrm chooses in equilibrium.
For those parameter values where the equilibrium patenting rule of Proposition 6
(c) exists, I obtain the following comparative statics result (using Deﬁnition 1).15
15The proof of this proposition is similar to the proof of proposition 2, and is therefore ommitted.
16Proposition 7 For any γo <γ<1− 1
4β, the equilibrium threshold θ
c in Proposition
6 (c) is increasing in γ.
The comparison between critical value γo, on the one hand, and the values 1− 1
2β
and 1 − 1
4β, on the other, depends on the size of the average technology, E{θI}.I n
particular, γo is decreasing in the average technology E{θI}, and three situations can



















Figure 4: Comparative statics (Cournot competition)
and SP stand for full patenting, full secrecy, and selective patenting, respectively.
An increase of the protection parameter γ reduces the strength of the expropriation
eﬀect, and gives a greater incentive to patent. An increase of the average technology
E{θI} increases the strength of the signaling eﬀect (since the disclosure of an eﬃcient
technology results in a more drastic update of beliefs), and increases the incentive to
patent.
First, if E{θI} is suﬃciently small (i.e., the technology distribution is skewed
towards eﬃcient technologies), then γo > 1 − 1
4β. In this case there is a range of
patent validity probabilities (i.e., for 1 − 1
2β ≤ γ ≤ γo) where equilibrium with full
patenting (part a), and the equilibrium with full secrecy (part b) coexist. However,
the suﬃcient condition of part (c) is violated. Hence, an equilibrium where ﬁrm I
patents only eﬃcient technologies may not exist.
Second, if E{θI} is close enough to 1
2(θ + θ) (e.g. the technology density f is
symmetric on the interval [θ,θ]), then 1 − 1
2β<γ o < 1 − 1
4β. This implies that the
range of patent validity probabilities [1− 1
2β,γo] exists, where both equilibria with full
17patenting and full secrecy exist. Moreover, now there is a non-empty range of validity
probabilities where ﬁrm I patents only the most eﬃcient technologies in equilibrium
(part c). In this range also the equilibrium with full patenting exists.
Finally, if E{θI} is suﬃciently large (i.e., the technology distribution is skewed
towards ineﬃcient technologies), then γo < 1 − 1
2β. Again, an equilibrium exists in
which only the most eﬃcient technologies are patented for the non-empty parameter
range [γo,1− 1
4β] (part c). On the subset [1− 1
2β,1− 1
4β] of this range there is also an
equilibrium in which ﬁrm I patents all technologies (part a). Furthermore, there are
no longer parameter values where the full patenting equilibrium and the full secrecy
equilibrium coexist.
4.3.3 Technology Diﬀusion
The comparison of equilibrium patenting strategies of Propositions 1 and 6 depends on
the strength of intellectual property right protection (γ). In particular, for suﬃciently
weak patent protection (e.g. γ ≤ min{1 − 1
2β,γo}) an innovative ﬁrm patents more
technologies under Bertrand than under Cournot. For these parameter values a ﬁrm
adopts full secrecy under Cournot competition, while it adopts a selective patenting
strategy, where the worst technologies are patented, under Bertrand competition. In
other words, there is a greater diﬀusion of technology under Bertrand competition
with weak protection.
If, however, protection is suﬃciently strong, but imperfect (e.g. max{1− 1
4β,γo} ≤
γ<1), then an innovative ﬁrm patents more technologies under Cournot competi-
tion than under Bertrand competition. Whereas ﬁrm I patents any technology (full
patenting) for marginally weaker than perfect patent protection under Cournot com-
petition, it keeps the most eﬃcient technologies secret under Bertrand competition.
That is, the technology diﬀusion is greater under Cournot competition when patent
protection is strong. In section 6 I brieﬂy discuss the implications of this observation
for the expected consumer surplus.
5 Discussion
In this section I discuss the robustness of the basic results. First, I adopt diﬀerent
demand functions. Second, I reverse the game’s timing. Finally, I extend the model
by allowing both ﬁrms to be innovative.
185.1 Demand
The model uses the linear demand function of Dixit (1979). This demand function is
easy, and it is frequently used in the literature. One property of this demand function
is that the size of the market changes by changing the parameters β and N.A n
alternative linear demand function, which does not have this property, can be derived



































The parameter b represents the degree of substitutability. It is well-known that for
this demand function changes of b and N leave the size of the market unaﬀected.
As it turns out, the results of sections 3 and 4 are robust with respect to a change
from demand function (2.4) to (5.2). A change in the market size yields a change in
price levels. However, the patenting incentives are determined by price diﬀerences
(between prices under patenting and prices under secrecy), not the price levels. This
explains why the analysis of the incentives in markets with the demand function (5.2)
gives results that are qualitatively identical to those of Propositions 1-5 (for further
details, see Appendix B).
5.2 Timing
The model assumes that the ﬁrms choose their prices after the patent validity is
determined. This assumption has no eﬀect on the qualitative results.
Consider the model where the patent validity is determined after the ﬁrms set
prices. In the subgame that starts after the innovative ﬁrm patents its technology,
the non-innovative ﬁr m sc h o o s ep r i c e st h a tm a x i m i z et h e i re x p e c t e dp r o ﬁts πn(p;γ)=
Dn(p)
£
pn − γθ − (1 − γ)θI
¤
for n ∈ {1,..,N}. This gives the equilibrium price-cost
margins mb
I(θI,N[γθ+(1−γ)θI]) and mb
n(γθ+(1−γ)θI,θ I +(N −1)[γθ+(1−γ)θI])
for n ∈ {1,..,N},w i t hmb
  as in (3.3). Firm I’s expected proﬁt gain from secrecy can
be written as
1+(N−1)β







I(x,N[γθ +( 1− γ)x])
2. (5.3)
19This function has the same properties as the function Ψb in (3.7), and therefore
Propositions 1-5 also hold for the model with a reversed timing (see Appendix B for
further details).
5.3 Two-Sided Asymmetric Information
In this section I extend the model by allowing all ﬁrms to be innovative. In particular,
there are two innovative ﬁrms, I1 and I2, and no non-innovative ﬁrms (N =0 ). At
the beginning of the game each ﬁrm receives a draw from the interval [θ,θ].F i r m ’s
technology θ  has the distribution F  :[ θ,θ] → [0,1] with   ∈ {I1,I 2}.T h e d r a w s
θI1 and θI2 are independent. Subsequently, the ﬁrms choose simultaneously whether
to patent the innovation or keep it secret. To simplify the analysis, I assume that
patents are invalid, i.e., γ =0 , and conditions (2.5) and (2.6) hold.
The pricing strategies in the models of one-sided and two-sided asymmetric infor-
mation are similar. Yet two diﬀerences are noteworthy. First, a ﬁrm with access to
both technologies adopts the most productive technology, min{θI1,θ I2},w h i c hc o u l d
be its own or its competitor’s technology. By contrast, in the model with one-sided
asymmetric information a non-innovative ﬁrm always adopts the technology of the
innovative ﬁrm, if it has access to this technology. Second, there are diﬀerent con-
tingencies in the model of two-sided asymmetric information. Now two ﬁrms choose
whether to share technology or keep it secret. For further details I refer to Appendix
B.
The following proposition shows that the equilibrium technology sharing strategies
in the models with one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information are similar (see
Appendix B).
Proposition 8 If γ =0 ,t h e ni na n ye q u i l i b r i u m ,a n df o ra n yi ∈ {I1,I 2}, ﬁrm i
chooses the patenting rule (3.8) with θ
b replaced by θ
b
i for some θ <θ
b
i < θ.
A ﬁrm’s technology sharing strategy trades oﬀ an expropriation eﬀect against
a signaling eﬀect. Even though I assume in this section that patents are invalid
(γ =0 ), it is uncertain whether a shared technology will be adopted or not, since this
d e p e n d so nt h er e l a t i v ee ﬃciency of two technology draws. Whereas in the model
with one-sided asymmetric information the probability of imitation was exogenously
ﬁxed, here it depends on the size of the innovation, and the technology distribution of
the competitor. In spite of this diﬀerence, the ﬁrms’ incentives to share technologies
are similar to the incentives with one-sided asymmetric information.
206C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper I analyzed the eﬀects of probabilistic patent validity on strategic patent
choices in an oligopoly with asymmetric information, and diﬀerentiated goods. Bertrand
competitors choose selective patenting strategies where the worst technologies are
patented, while the best technologies are kept secret.
Diﬀerent measures of competitive pressure have diﬀerent eﬀects on the incentives
to patent a process innovation. Whereas an increase in the degree of substitutability
increases the patenting incentives of ﬁrms that use accommodating pricing strategies,
an increase in the number of ﬁrms has the opposite eﬀect. Therefore, an increase in the
number of non-innovative ﬁrms has two conﬂicting eﬀect on the expected consumer
surplus. On the one hand, it increases the expected consumer surplus for a given
level of technology diﬀusion. This is a direct eﬀect. On the other hand, it reduces
the expected surplus throu g har e d u c t i o ni nt h ed i ﬀusion of technology. This is an
indirect eﬀect. That is, the strategic management of intellectual property reduces the
surplus gain from entry of non-innovative ﬁrms. This may have implications for the
optimal economic policy towards entry in innovative industries with weak intellectual
property right protection.
Changing the mode of product market competition has yet diﬀerent eﬀects. If
the patent protection is weak, then an innovative ﬁrm patents more technologies un-
der Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. For suﬃciently weak
protection of intellectual property a ﬁrm adopts full secrecy under Cournot competi-
tion, while it adopts a selective patenting strategy under Bertrand competition. In
this case, the bigger diﬀusion of technology increases the expected consumer surplus
under Bertrand competition, which widens the surplus gap between Bertrand and
Cournot competition.
I f ,h o w e v e r ,p r o t e c t i o ni ss u ﬃciently strong, but imperfect, then an innovative ﬁrm
patents more technologies under Cournot competition than under Bertrand compe-
tition. Whereas a Cournot competitor patents any innovation (due to an unraveling
result), a Bertrand competitor resorts to a selective patenting strategy. In this case
the greater technology diﬀusion under Cournot competition increases the expected
consumer surplus under Cournot competition, and reduces the surplus gap between
Bertrand and Cournot competition. In fact, there are circumstances in which the
typical consumer surplus ranking is reversed.
For example, if goods are perfect substitutes, then a Bertrand competitor has no
incentive to patent its technology, whereas a Cournot competitor patents all technolo-
21gies, if patent protection is suﬃciently strong. In this case, the following properties
are favorable for obtaining a higher expected consumer surplus under Cournot com-
petition than under Bertrand competition. First, an eﬃcient average technology and
relatively low levels of patent protection give a high expected knowledge spillover un-
der Cournot competition. The high level of expected technology diﬀusion increases
the expected consumer surplus under Cournot competition. Second, a low demand
intercept keeps the price low under Cournot competition, while it does not aﬀect the
price under Bertrand competition. Further, a high technology variance is also favor-
able for the reversal of the surplus ranking, since it creates a high output variance
under Cournot competition, which increases the expected consumer surplus. For more
details and a formal proof of this observation, see Appendix B.
Finally, the paper’s results may also have implications for patent policy. An in-
crease of the patent protection gives the following trade-oﬀ for consumers. On the
one hand, an increase of the protection reduces the likelihood of expropriation of
patented technologies. In other words, welfare-enhancing technology transfers from
an innovative ﬁrm to non-innovative ﬁrms become less likely. On the other hand,
increasing the probability of patent validity has an indirect eﬀect through a change of
the equilibrium patenting strategy. Increasing the probability of validity implies that
more technologies are patented (i.e., θ
b decreases). First, this increases the expected
consumer surplus at the margin, since it replaces the expected surplus under secrecy
by the expected surplus under patenting. Second, reducing θ
b changes the equilib-
rium beliefs of non-innovative ﬁrms after the adoption of secrecy. In particular, after
ar e d u c t i o no fθ
b the ﬁrm expects a more eﬃcient competitor in the product market,
which reduces equilibrium prices under secrecy. Both indirect eﬀects are positive.
Whereas Appendix B contains some preliminary results on the consumer surplus, a
more careful analysis awaits future research.
22Appendix
A Proofs of Propositions
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1











This inequality is equivalent to Ψb(θI,E{θI|∅}) ≤ 0,w i t hΨb as deﬁned in (3.7).
Notice that Ψb(x,y) is strictly convex in x:
∂2Ψb



































for any x,y ∈ [θ,θ] and 0 ≤ γ<1, since all (partial) derivatives are negative. The
evaluation of Ψb for extreme values of x and γ<1 yields the following. Ψb(θ,y) > 0
for any y ∈ [θ,θ]. Consequently (due to continuity), the posterior expected cost y
consistent with the equilibrium patenting strategy must be strictly below θ.I fy<θ,
then Ψb(θ,y) < 0. The inequality Ψb(θ,y) < 0 < Ψb(θ,y) for y<θ in combination
with the convexity of Ψb in θI yields the observation that any equilibrium patenting
rule must be as in (3.8) for some θ ≤ θ
b ≤ θ. Posterior beliefs consistent with this
rule yield E{θI|∅} = E{θI|θI ≤ θ
b}. The equilibrium threshold value θ




b(x,E{θI|θI ≤ x}) (A.1)
Clearly, e Ψb(θ)=Ψb(θ,θ) > 0 for any γ<1,a n de Ψb(θ)=Ψb(θ,E{θI}) < 0.T h e
intermediate value theorem implies that for any γ<1 a θ
b exists, with θ <θ
b < θ,
such that e Ψb(θ
b)=0 .
If γ =1 ,t h e nΨb(x,y)=0iﬀ x = y,a n dΨb(x,y) < 0 iﬀ x>y . Clearly, the only
possible equilibrium is (3.8) with θ
b = θ.16 ¤
16Any interior θ
b (i.e. θ <θ
b < θ) cannot emerge in equilibrium, since a root of e Ψb would require
that E{θI|θI ≤ θ
b} = θ
b, which is impossible for non-degenerate p.d.f.-s. Also θ
b = θ cannot emerge
in equilibrium, since Ψb(x;E{θI}) < 0 for any x>E {θI}.
23P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Take any pair γ0 and γ00,w i t h0 ≤ γ0 <γ 00 < 1. Denote the function e Ψb in (A.1) as
e Ψb(x;γ) for any 0 ≤ γ<1.M o r e o v e r ,f o ra l lθ ≤ x<θ:
e Ψ
b(x;γ



















=0 ,w h e r eθ <θ
b(γ) < θ for any 0 ≤ γ<1 (see
proposition 1). Now (A.2), together with θ













Furthermore, e Ψb (θ;γ00) > 0,s i n c eγ00 < 1. The intermediate value theorem implies
that a θ
b(γ00) exists, with θ <θ
b(γ00) <θ
b(γ0), such that e Ψb ¡
θ
b(γ00);γ00¢
=0 ,s i n c e
e Ψb (x;γ) is continuous in x,a n de Ψb ¡
θ
b(γ0);γ00¢
< 0 < e Ψb (θ;γ00). ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
This proof is analogous to the proof of proposition 2. Take any pair of c.d.f.-s F and
G,w i t hEF{θI|θI ≤ x} ≥ EG{θI|θI ≤ x} for any x ∈ [θ,θ].T h ef u n c t i o nΨb in (3.7)
has the following property for all θ ≤ x<θ:
Ψ




I (x;EF{θI|θI ≤ x})
2 − m
B




F such that: Ψb ¡
θ
b




=0 ,w h e r eθ <θ
b
F < θ for any γ<1
(see proposition 1). Inequality (A.3), together with γ<1 and θ
b
F < θ, gives:
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The intermediate value theorem implies that a θ
b













P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
If γ =0 ,t h e nﬁrm I is indiﬀerent between sharing technology θI and keeping it secret



























I (x;E{θI|θI ≤ x})+mb
I(x,Nx)
¤





b(x;β,N) ≡ 2[1+(N − 1)β](θ − x)+β(E{θI|θI ≤ x} − x) (A.4)
For N = N0 the critical value θ
b(N0) of equilibrium strategy (3.8) is such that
ψ
b(θ





00)=2 [ 1 + ( N










(N00 − N0)2β(θ − θ
b(N0)) > 0,a n dψ
b(θ;β,N00)=−β(θ − E{θI}) < 0. Hence,
the intermediate value theorem yields the existence of critical value θ
b(N00),w i t h
θ
b(N0) <θ
b(N00) < θ, such that ψ
b(θ
b(N00);β,N00)=0 . ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5










b as in (A.4). For β = β
00,w i t hβ
00 >β






00,N)=2 [ 1 + ( N − 1)β
00](θ − x)+β
















































0)) < 0,a n dψ
b(θ;β
00,N)=2 [ 1 + ( N − 1)β
00](θ − θ) > 0.












P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6





I(θI,Nθ I) ≥ π
C
I (θI;E{θI|∅})



















Using (4.5) and (4.6), this inequality is equivalent to Ψc(θI,E{θI|∅}) ≤ 0,w h e r e :
Ψ




















(2 + βN)(2 − β)
¶
(A.5)
for x,y ∈ [θ,θ]. The function Ψc is decreasing and convex in y (i.e., ∂Ψc/∂y < 0 and
∂2Ψc/∂y2 > 0 for any x,y). The ﬁrst partial derivative of Ψc with respect to x equals:
∂Ψc(x,y)
∂x




















I(x,Nθ)/∂x = −[2+β(N−1)]/[(2+Nβ)(2−β)]. The second partial derivative




(2 + Nβ)(2 − β)
µ








Notice that Ψc is strictly convex (concave) in x if and only if γ<e γ (resp. γ>e γ)
where:








The evaluation of Ψc for extreme values of x and γ<1 yields the following. Firm
I has no incentive to patent the least eﬃcient technology, since Ψc(θ,y) > 0 for all
y<θ,a n dΨc(θ,θ)=0 . These properties of Ψc imply that only the following four
kinds of patenting rules can be chosen in equilibrium.
(a) Full disclosure: Firm I patents any technology in equilibrium if and only if
Ψc(x,θ) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ [θ,θ]. Clearly, Ψc(θ,θ)=0 . Consequently, a necessary con-
dition for the existence of a full disclosure equilibrium is ∂Ψc(θ,θ)/∂x ≤ 0.F r o m
substitution of (x,y)=( θ,θ) in (A.6) it follows immediately that the necessary con-
dition is equivalent to: γ ≥ 1 − 1
2β. Under this condition Ψc(x,θ) is strictly concave
in x (i.e., ∂2Ψc/∂x2 > 0), since 1 − 1
2β>e γ, as follows from (A.8). This implies that
the necessary condition is also suﬃcient.
(b) Full secrecy: Firm I keeps any technology secret in equilibrium if and only if











26where the ﬁrst inequality follows from convexity of Ψc in x, the second inequality
follows from the facts that ∂Ψc/∂x is increasing in γ and e γ<1 − 1
2β,a n dt h e
last inequality follows immediately from evaluating (A.6) for (x,y)=( θ,E{θI}) and
γ =1− 1
2β. Consequently, Ψc(x,E{θI}) > 0 for all x if γ<e γ. Second, if γ ≥ e γ,t h e n
the concavity of Ψc in x implies that the necessary and suﬃcient condition for full
secrecy in equilibrium is Ψc(θ,E{θI}) ≥ 0. This inequality reduces to the following:




















(2 + βN)(2 − β)
¶
which is equivalent to γ ≤ γo,w i t hγo as in (4.7). Clearly, γo is decreasing in the









2N (2 − β)(θ − θ)
4
£
2(2 − β)(α − θ)+[ 4+β(N − 2)](θ − θ)
¤ <γ
o < 1 (A.9)
Furthermore, the comparison of (A.8) and (A.9) yields e γ<γ o.
( c )P a t e n to n l yt h eb e s tt e c h n o l o g i e s :This proof is similar to the proof of
proposition 1. Suppose there exists a technology θ
c,w i t hθ <θ
c < θ,s u c ht h a tﬁrm
I chooses the patenting rule (4.8) in equilibrium. The beliefs consistent with this
rule gives the expected cost E{θI|θI >θ
c}. The rule (4.8) is an equilibrium rule if
and only iﬀ Ψc(x,E{θI|θI >θ
c}) ≤ 0 for all x ≤ θ
c,a n dΨc(x,E{θI|θI >θ
c}) ≥ 0
otherwise. Deﬁne the continuous function e Ψc(x) ≡ Ψc(x,E{θI|θI >x }) for x ∈ [θ,θ].
Evaluation of e Ψc for extreme values of x yields the following. On the one hand,
e Ψc(θ)=Ψc(θ,E{θI}), which is non-positive if and only if γ ≥ γo (see part b). On
































































where the last equality follows from the application of the De L’Hospital rule, i.e.,
lim
θ↑θ


























Hence, (A.10) yields: de Ψc(θ)/dx < 0 iﬀ γ<1 − 1
4β.I f de Ψc(θ)/dx < 0,t h e nt h e r e
exists a θ
0,w i t hθ
0 < θ,s u c ht h a te Ψc(θ
0) > 0. Consequently, if γo < 1 − 1
4β,t h e nf o r
any γo <γ<1 − 1
4β the intermediate value theorem implies that there exists an θ
c
with θ <θ
c < θ such that e Ψc(θ
c)=0 . In other words, the equilibrium rule (4.8) with
θ <θ
c < θ exists if γo <γ<1 − 1
4β.
(d) Patent only intermediate technologies: Finally, if γ<e γ, an equilibrium
may exist in which ﬁrm I patents any technology θI in some interval [l,h],w i t h
θ <l<h<θ, but keeps other technologies secret. The posterior belief consistent
with such a patenting rule gives the expected cost μlh ≡ E{θI|θI / ∈ [l,h]}.T w o
necessary equilibrium conditions are:
Ψ
c(z,E{θI|θI / ∈ [l,h]})=0for z ∈ {l,h}

















In other words, an equilibrium with patenting of intermediate technologies exists if
there exists a pair l and h with θ <l<h<θ such that γI(l;μlh)=γI(h;μlh),w h i c h










































































































































































(2 + βN)(2 − β)


































since μlh < θ, and all other terms are strictly positive as well. In other words, an
equilibrium in which ﬁrm I patents only intermediate technologies cannot exist. ¤
29BE x t e n s i o n s
Here I present a brief description of some model extensions. First, I adopt a diﬀerent
demand function. Second, I reverse the timing. Third, I analyze a model with two
innovative ﬁrms. Finally, I give some implications for the expected consumer surplus.
B.1 Demand
Assume that the direct demand for ﬁrm  ’s good is (5.2) for   ∈ {I,1,..N}.P r o ﬁt-
maximization by ﬁrm   gives ﬁrm  ’s best response (for  ,k ∈ {I,1,..,N}):














Solving for the equilibrium prices in the cases of complete and incomplete information























bN (E{θI|∅} − θI)
[2(N +1 )+Nb][2(N +1 )+( 2 N +1 ) b]









The proﬁt gain from secrecy instead of patenting reduces to N+1+Nb
(N+1)2 Ψs(θI,E{θI|∅}),
where Ψs(x,y) is as in (3.7) with mb
I and mB
I replaced by ms
I and mS
I respectively.
Using these expressions, it is easy to show the same results as in Propositions 1-5.17
B.2 Timing






I (x;y) − mb













17In particular, the comparative statics analyses with respect to N and b reduce to analyzing the
properties of the function ψ
s(x;b,N)=2 ( N +1+Nb)(θ − x)+b(E{θi|θi ≤ x}) as in (A.4).
30s i n c ea l lt e r m sa r en e g a t i v e . A l s oi fγ<1,t h e nΨT(θ,y) < 0 < ΨT(θ,y) holds for
y<θ, and in particular ΨT(θ,E{θI}) < 0 < ΨT(θ,θ).T h i sc o n ﬁrms that Proposition





I(x,N[γθ +( 1− γ)x])
∂mb
I(x,N[γθ +( 1− γ)x])
∂γ
< 0
This establishes that Proposition 2 also holds with the reverse timing. The remaining
comparative statics results are identical to those in the original model.
B.3 Two-Sided Asymmetric Information
S u p p o s et h a tp a t e n t sa r ei n v a l i d ,γ =0 . First, I present the equilibrium pricing
strategies. Second, I characterize the patenting strategies.
B.3.1 Pricing Strategies
Take any subset Sk ⊆ [θ,θ] and Pk ≡ [θ,θ]\Sk, and assume that ﬁrm   has beliefs
consistent with the adoption of the following generic patenting strategy by ﬁrm k (for
 ,k ∈ {I1,I 2} and   6= k):
b sk(θk)=
½
∅, if θk ∈ Sk
θk, if θk ∈ Pk
(B.1)
That is, the expected cost of ﬁrm k after adoption of secrecy is E{θk|θk ∈ Sk}.
If both ﬁrms share their technologies, then they set equilibrium prices which yield
the following price-cost margins (for  ,k ∈ {I1,I 2} and   6= k):
m
PP
  (θ ;θ ,θ k) ≡ p
PP




α − min{θ ,θ k}
¶
. (B.2)
If both ﬁrms keep their technologies secret, ﬁrm   chooses the following price-cost
margin in equilibrium (for  ,k ∈ {I1,I 2} and   6= k):
m
SS
  (θ ;S ,Sk)=p
SS












E{θk|θk ∈ Sk} − θ  +
β
2
[E{θ |θ  ∈ S } − θ ]
¶
.
If ﬁrm   shares technology θ  and ﬁrm k conceals, the ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-order conditions
are as follows (for  ,k ∈ {I1,I 2} and   6= k):
2p (θ )=( 1 − β)α + θ  + β
Z
θ∈Sk
fk(θ|θk ∈ Sk)pk(θ,θ )dθ
and 2pk(θk,θ  )=( 1− β)α +m i n {θ ,θ k} + βp (θ ).
31In this case (ﬁrm   shares, ﬁrm k conceals) ﬁrm   sets the following equilibrium margin:
m
PS
  (θ ;θ ,Sk)=p
PS












E (min{θ ,θ k}|θk ∈ Sk) − θ 
¶
,
with E (min{θ ,θ k}|θk ∈ Sk)=Fk(θk|θk ∈ Sk)E{θk|θk ≤ θ ,θ k ∈ Sk}+[1 − Fk(θk|θk ∈ Sk)]θ .
Similarly, if ﬁrm   hides θ  and ﬁrm k shares, ﬁrm   sets the following price-cost margin
in equilibrium (for  ,k ∈ {I1,I 2} and   6= k):
m
SP
  (θ ;S ,θ k)=p
SP
















[E (min{θ ,θ k}|θ  ∈ S ) − min{θ ,θ k}]
¶
.
Firm  ’s expected equilibrium product market proﬁti s( f o ra n yt  and tk):
π
t tk





  (θ ;•)
2 (B.6)
B.3.2 Patenting Strategies
The analysis of the equilibrium patenting strategies in the model with two-sided asym-
metric information is analogous to the analysis in the model with one-sided asymmet-
ric information (see the proof of proposition 1). Suppose that ﬁrm k chooses the
technology sharing rule b sk in (B.1). Further, suppose that ﬁrm k has beliefs consis-
tent with (B.1), with k =  , for some subsets S  ⊆ [θ,θ] and P  =[ θ,θ]\S .G i v e n
these assumptions, the diﬀerence of the expected proﬁt from technology sharing and
secrecy for ﬁrm   is:
Ψ






  (θ ;θ ,θ k) − π
SP









  (θ ;θ ,Sk) − π
SS






  (θ ;θ ,θ k) − π
SP







  (θ ;θ ,θ k)
2 − m
SP








  (θ ;θ ,θ k) − m
SP
  (θ ;S ,θ k)]
·[m
PP
  (θ ;θ ,θ k)+m
SP
  (θ ;S ,θ k)]
32and a similar expression for πPS
  (θ ;θ ,Sk)−πSS
  (θ ;S ,Sk). The evaluation of ΨB at
extreme values of θ  gives the following: ΨB(θ;S ,Sk) < 0 ≤ ΨB(θ;S ,Sk) for any S 


































2 Pr[θk ∈ Sk]
∙µ
∂mPS



















  (θ ;θ ,Sk)
∂2mPS





since for any θ  ∈ [θ,θ]
∂2mPP

















First, using (B.2) and (B.5), it is immediate that
∂mPP
  (θ ;θ ,θk)
∂θ  −
∂mSP
  (θ ;S ,θk)
∂θ  ≥ 0
and
∂mPP
  (θ ;θ ,θk)
∂θ  +
∂mSP
  (θ ;S ,θk)
∂θ  ≤ 0 for any θ  and θk,s i n c e∂ min{θ ,θ k}/∂θ  ≥ 0.
Second, using (B.3) and (B.4), gives
∂mPS
  (θ ;θ ,Sk)
∂θ  −
∂mSS
  (θ ;S ,Sk)
∂θ  > 0 and
∂mPS
  (θ ;θ ,Sk)
∂θ  +
∂mSS
  (θ ;S ,Sk)
∂θ  < 0,s i n c e∂E(min{θ ,θ k}|θk ∈ Sk)/∂θ  =P r [ θk ∈ Sk ∩ [θ ,θ]]/Pr[θk ∈
Sk] ∈ [0,1]. Finally,
∂2mPS













Hence, ∂2ΨB(θ ;S ,Sk)/∂θ
2
  ≤ 0, i.e., ΨB(θ ;S ,Sk) is (weakly) concave in θ .T h i s
fact, in combination with ΨB(θ;•) < 0 ≤ ΨB(θ;•),i m p l i e st h a tﬁrm  ’s equilibrium
patenting strategy is (B.1) for k =  ,w i t hS  =[ θ,θ
b
 ] for some θ ≤ θ
b
  ≤ θ.T h e
evaluation of ΨB(x;[θ,x],Sk) for extreme values of x gives:
Ψ
B(θ;[θ,θ],Sk) < 0 < Ψ
B(θ;[θ,θ],Sk)
for any Sk ⊆ [θ,θ], Hence, the intermediate value theorem implies that (for any
Sk ⊆ [θ,θ])t h e r ee x i s t saθ
b
 ,w i t hθ <θ
b




 ],Sk)=0 . ¤
33B.4 Consumer Surplus
Here I analyze the eﬀects of product market competition and strategic patenting on
the consumer surplus. The consumer surplus for any output bundle q equals (using
deﬁnition 2.2):



















In equilibrium the consumer surplus Sr(•) ≡ S(qr
I(•),qr
n(•)) is reached under regime r























The ﬁrst term of (B.7) represents the expected surplus from Bertrand competition
under secrecy, while the second term represents the expected surplus from Bertrand
competition with patenting.
B.4.1 Mode of Competition
A switch from Bertrand competition to Cournot competition changes the diﬀusion of
technology in the industry. The diﬀerence in technology diﬀusion is most pronounced
when the goods are homogeneous (i.e., β =1 ). In such a market the consumer surplus
simpliﬁes to: S(q)=U(q;ω) −
P
  P (q)q  − ω = 1
2 (
P
  q )
2. If patent protection
is imperfect (γ<1), then ﬁrm I has no incentive to patent its technology θI under
Bertrand competition (i.e., θ
b = θ in 3.8), since it prefers not to share the market with









By contrast, under Cournot competition ﬁr m sc h o o s ea c c o m m o d a t i n gs t r a t e g i e s ,a n d
Proposition 6 applies, as long as the market is big enough (i.e., the demand intercept α
is suﬃciently high). Suppose this is the case. For suﬃciently high validity probabilities
(e.g. γ ≥ 3












c(θ,(N − 1)θ + θI)
¤2





34The condition under which the expected consumer surplus under Cournot competition
exceeds the surplus under Bertrand competition (i.e., CSc(γ) ≥ CSb(γ))i se q u i v a l e n t
























Comparison of the critical value γ∗ with the value γo gives feasibility of γo <γ<
min{γ∗,1} for some particular model speciﬁcations.
Proposition 9 If goods are homogeneous (β =1 ), the market is suﬃciently small (α
close to 2θ − θ), and the technology distribution is suﬃciently skewed (E{θI} close
to θ), then the critical protection parameter γc exists, with γo <γ c ≤ 1,s u c ht h a t :
CSc(γ) >C S b(γ) for all γo <γ<γ c.






















Using (B.8) and (B.11), it is easy to reduce the inequality CSc(γ) ≥ CSb(γ) to γ ≤ γ∗,





2(N +1 ) α − (2N +1 ) θ − E{θI}
¤






2(N +1 ) α − Nθ − (N +2 ) E{θI}
¤
+ N(N +2 ) var{θI}





(2N +3 ) ( θ − θ) − (E{θI} − θ)
¤






(3N +4 ) ( θ − θ) − (N +2 ) ( E{θI} − θ)
¤
+ N(N +2 ) var{θI}




N(3N +4 ) ( θ − θ)2 + N(N +2 ) var{θI}
which exceeds 1. For any α ≥ 2θ − θ, the critical probability γo in (4.7) is such that
lim
E{θI}→θ
γo =1 ,a n dγo < 1 for all E{θI} >θ .H e n c e ,f o rα =2 θ−θ, lim
E{θI}→θ
(γ∗−γo) >
0,a n dc o n t i n u i t yo fγ∗ − γo in E{θI} gives the existence of γc ≡ min{γ∗,1} >γ o for
35some small mean E{θI} >θ . Further, a slightly higher α gives similar results, again
due to continuity. ¤
In other words, there are model speciﬁcations such that strategic patenting reverses
the typical surplus ranking of Cournot and Bertrand competition. The intuition for
this result is as follows. First, a low demand intercept (i.e., α is suﬃciently close to
2θ − θ) keeps the price low under Cournot competition, while it does not aﬀect the
price under Bertrand competition. Second, the expected knowledge spillover under
Cournot competition is the highest for low E{θI} and low γ.T h e h i g h l e v e l o f
expected technology diﬀusion increases expected consumer surplus under Cournot
competition. Further, a high variance of θI is also favorable for the reversal of the
ranking, since it creates a high output variance under Cournot competition, which
increases the expected consumer surplus.
Figure 5 illustrates the expected consumer surplus comparison under the con-


























Figure 5: Consumer surplus (Bertrand vs. Cournot)
Cournot competition, when ﬁrm I keeps its innovation secret (i.e., for γ ≤ γo). The
thin downward-sloping line represents the consumer surplus under Cournot competi-
tion when ﬁrm I patents all technologies (i.e., for γ ≥ 1
2). The bold ﬂat line represents
the expected consumer surplus under Bertrand competition. First, in the absence of
expropriation, information sharing gives a lower consumer surplus than information
concealment when ﬁrms compete in quantities (Shapiro, 1986): CSc(1) <C S c(0)
as Figure 5 illustrates. This property is related to Proposition 10. Second, given se-
crecy, Bertrand competition gives a higher expected surplus than Cournot competition
36(Singh and Vives, 1984): CSc(0) <C S b. Finally, given full patenting and Cournot
competition, a reduction of the patent validity parameter from perfect protection
increases the expected surplus due to increased technology diﬀusion.
B.4.2 Patent Policy
Consider a consumer surplus-maximizing economic policy maker who can aﬀect the
value of the patent validity, γ, in a market with suﬃciently diﬀerentiated goods. The














































This expression captures the following eﬀects. On the one hand, an increase of the
probability γ reduces the likelihood of expropriation of patented technologies. In other
words, welfare-enhancing technology transfers from ﬁrm I to ﬁrms 1,..,N become less
likely. This direct eﬀe c t ,w h i c hi sc a p t u r e db yt h eﬁrst term of expression (B.12), is
negative. On the other hand, increasing the probability of patent validity has an
indirect eﬀect through a change of the equilibrium patenting strategy. Increasing the
probability of validity implies that more technologies are patented (i.e., θ
b decreases).
First, this increases the expected welfare at the margin, since it replaces the expected
welfare under secrecy by the expected welfare under patenting. This positive eﬀect is
captured in the second term of (B.12). Second, reducing θ
b changes the equilibrium
beliefs of ﬁrms 1,..,N after the adoption of secrecy. In particular, after a reduction of
θ
b the non-innovative ﬁr m se x p e c tam o r ee ﬃcient competitor in the product market,
which reduces equilibrium prices under secrecy. This positive eﬀect is captured by
the third term of (B.12). The optimal patenting policy resolves the trade-oﬀ between
these eﬀects.
The comparison of the expected consumer surplus for perfect patent protection
(γ =1 ) and no patent protection (γ =0 ) reduces to the surplus comparison between
information sharing and selective patenting. First, for technologies that are shared
in the absence of patent protection, prices are lower without protection, due to the
diﬀusion of technology in this case. Second, for technologies that are kept secret
in the absence of patent protection the consumers are on average better oﬀ without
patent protection, since output levels have a greater variance under secrecy, which
37yields a quantity adjustment eﬀect there (e.g. Vives, 1999). Both eﬀects give a higher
expected surplus under no protection.
Proposition 10 Perfect intellectual property protection yields a lower expected con-
sumer surplus than no protection, i.e., CSb(1) <C S b(0). Moreover, a reduction of
the patent validity from perfect protection increases the expected consumer surplus
initially, i.e., dCSb(1)/dγ < 0.






B(θI;E{θI|θI ≤ θ0}) − S
b(θI,θ)





b(θI,θ I) − S
b(θI,θ)
¯ ¯θI >θ 0
ª
where θ0 ≡ limγ→0 θ




B(θI;E{θI|θI ≤ θ0}) − S
b(θI,θ)








2)2Va r{θI|θI ≤ θ0} > 0.
Moreover, Sb(θI,θ I) >S b(θI,θ) for any θI < θ,i fβ is suﬃciently small (such that
ﬁrm I has no incentive to set a limit price). Hence, CSb(0) >C S b(1).
Finally, dCSb(1)/dγ = E
©
Sb(θI,θ) − Sb(θI,θ I)
ª
< 0,s i n c elim
γ→1θ
b = θ. ¤
Finally, there may exist intermediate patent validity parameter values (0 <γ<1)
that generate a higher expected consumer surplus than under no patent protection.
Figure 6 illustrates the expected surplus under Bertrand competition for a uniformly
distributed technology parameter θI.
The relation between the protection parameter and consumer surplus is similar for
ﬁrms that compete in quantities (Cournot competition).18
18Under Cournot competition the comparison of the expected consumer surplus for perfect patent
protection (γ =1 ) and no patent protection (γ =0 ) reduces to the surplus comparison between
information sharing and information concealment. The consumers are on average better oﬀ without
patent protection than with perfect patent protection, since the expected consumer surplus from








Figure 6: Consumer surplus (uniform distribution)
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